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Introduction
Security studies has been among the last bastions of neorealist orthodoxy in International Relations to
accept critical, or even theoretically-sophisticated, challenges to its problematic. Recent polemical
exchanges in the security studies literature have, however, at least linked the term "critical theory" with
security studies, and although they do not necessarily advance the debate, they at least raise the
question: what is a critical approach to security studies? My goal in this paper is not to invoke a new
orthodoxy of "critical security studies" or to participate in polemical recriminations, but to illustrate
what a critical engagement with issues and questions that have been taken as the subject matter of
security studies involves. I do this in several steps:
a) a review of the (brief) debate in security studies concerning the contributions of "critical"
scholarship;
b) a presentation of the intellectual "foundations" of critical approaches to International
Relations;
c) an overview of current research within "critical security studies" that illustrates its ability to
generate a challenging and productive research agenda;
d) a discussion of the intellectual and disciplining power of mainstream security scholarship,
and the difficulties this poses for critical challenges.2
What I will not do is present a critique of traditional research and theory in security studies,
except to highlight some of the conclusions of this critique.3 Since one of the main accusations levelled
against critical theory (at least in International Relations) is that it cannot get "beyond critique," I
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intend to demonstrate that one can find lurking in the interstices of the discipline a wide range of
critical scholarship and research that is "about" security (and its core subject matter), but which its
authors, or the discipline, refuses to label as such. Simply bringing together these perspectives makes
the challenges to orthodoxy more clear, and signals that critical approaches to security studies are more
than a passing fad or the idiosyncratic obsession of a few scholars.
Ultimately, this is healthy for security studies as a whole. Security studies continues to be
treated by many scholars as a theoretically-impoverished cousin to the sturdy children of International
Relations, which could include (depending on your preference) liberal and radical approaches to
International Political Economy, neoliberal institutionalist analyses, regime theory, foreign policy
analysis and so forth.4 Debate among competing approaches, and a greater conceptual clarity, can only
strengthen the claims of security studies scholars for intellectual respect. What is more, it is possible to
argue that far from falling into desuetude with the end of the Cold War, many of the most interesting
theoretical issues in International Relations - concerning, for example, identity politics and communal
conflict, multilateral security institutions, the development of norms and practices, and so-called new
issues (such as the environment) - can be most usefully studied through a prism labelled "security
studies."
Who's Who and What's in a Label?
An irresistible starting point for this discussion is John Mearsheimer's presentation of "critical theory"
in the context of his discussion of the "False Promise of International Institutions." His "who's who" of
critical theorists in International Relations includes Richard Ashley, Robert Cox, Friedrich Kratochwil,
John Ruggie, Yosef Lapid, Alexander Wendt, and perhaps Emanuel Adler, Richard Ned Lebow and
Thomas Risse-Kappen.5 Of course, this list is not exhaustive, and as Alexander Wendt points out, it
blurs important distinctions between post-modernist, constructivist, neo-Marxist and feminist scholars
(in fact it ignores scholarship in some of these camps).6 Perhaps Mearsheimer is right: the shared
assumptions of these scholars may be greater than their differences (and one is reminded of the
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response to a broad characterization of neorealist scholarship that critics such as Ashley have
presented). Their shared assumptions are not, however, what Mearsheimer thinks they are, and his
choice of exemplars betrays a different purpose (which I will discuss below). Here I want to highlight
one other feature of Mearsheimer's discussion: he does not cite any research that has been done under
his critical label (an error he does not make with other approaches), and he claims that "critical theorists
have yet to provide evidence that their theory can explain very much...the distinguishing feature of the
critical theory literature...is its lack of empirical content."7
Aside from his sloppiness with respect to research in critical International Relations, there
could be three possible reasons (or some combination thereof) for presenting the sort of review and
dismissal of other approaches that Mearsheimer offers. The first would be a belief that the differences
between critical and other approaches can be arbitrated (and the most appropriate approach selected) in
an a priori or logical deductive fashion. Mearsheimer's review steers perilously close to this in his
presentation of what he calls the "realist world" when what are assumptions of a realist theory start to
sound like descriptions of an actual world, which critical theory can somehow not explain. This is
especially manifest when he asserts that "realism was the dominant discourse from about the start of the
late medieval period in 1300 to at least 1989."8 Aside from the curious use of "discourse," no serious
scholar working in a rationalist paradigm would make the error of confusing the assumptions of the
theory, and the explanatory hypotheses these can generate, with the workings of the world. Critical
International Relations can (and does) offer an account of different features of these 700 years of
history, and does not exclude the possibility of "critical realist" explanations.9
The second reason might be the assumption that the ultimate test of our theories is some
external and objective reality against which they stand or fall. As Mearsheimer claims, "Realists
maintain that there is an objective and knowable world, which is separate from the observing
individual."10 This approach is self-contradictory, and fundamentally misunderstands the role of theory
in "constructing" what we see and how we see it - which Mearsheimer seems (if inadvertently) to
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recognize elsewhere when he says that "the debate is over which theory provides the best guide to
understanding state behavior."11 If reality is objectively knowable, then why do we need to construct
theories to organize or explain phenomena that present themselves to us? Conversely, if theories tell us
what to look for (and more importantly, how to organize disparate phenomena under labels such as
"bandwagoning" or "balancing," or "deterring" and "compelling") then reality is not "objectively"
knowable without being mediated via theories. Suddenly the choice of theoretical lenses becomes
important!
The third assumption could be that there is only one "set" of things to be explained by
International Relations, and that therefore critical approaches are judged by how well they (for
example) account for 700 years (or more) of ceaseless competition between states. This follows Martin
Wight's description of International Relations as the "realm of recurrence and repetition," and
effectively denies that a social theory of world politics has any subject matter.12 But it is possible that
critical and neorealist approaches represent incommensurable positions towards International Relations
(or security studies), and hence that there is no "neutral" point from which disagreements can be
arbitrated. The best one can hope for is to make a choice, dependent on what it is one is trying to
explain, and what one thinks are the appropriate means to go about this. Although Mearsheimer seems
to think this difference represents a trumping of ethical preferences or values over scholarly
commitments, instead it represents a set of choices on a different level (which is where the debate must
be engaged).13
Finally, I should register the obvious caveats over the use of the term "critical." Its use as an
umbrella term to describe all work that falls outside of the rationalist (neoliberal and neorealist)
paradigm does some violence to the intellectual origins of the term, in the German (Frankfurt) tradition
of critique associated with contemporary thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas. This tradition does not
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in fact, it is resolutely modernist in its rejection of them), but does present itself as an alternative to
rationalist social science. Perhaps the biggest problem, however, is that the very term critical in English
contains no connotations of a positive or reconstructive project, and allows both proponents and
opponents to stop at the theoretical level, without reflecting on the practical implications of this
scholarship. This is certainly not my intention. In what follows, I do not intend to parse the widely
divergent claims that are made by scholars working in a critical tradition. I do hope, however to
demonstrate, contra Mearsheimer, that there is much high quality critical research, that it is capable of
expanding our understanding of world politics, and that it needs to be understood on its own terms as
presenting a serious alternative to rationalist, neorealist, scholarship in security studies.
Foundational Claims of Critical International Relations
There are six foundational claims at the core of critical approaches to International Relations, which
can be summarized as follows:
• the principle actors (subjects) in world politics - whether these are states or not - are social
constructs, and products of complex historical processes that include social, political, material
and ideational dimensions;
• these subjects are constituted (and reconstituted) through political practices that create shared
social understandings; this process of constitution endows the subjects with identities and
interests (which are not "given" or unchanging);
• world politics is not static and unchanging, and its "structures" are not determining, since they
are also ultimately socially constructed;
• our knowledge of the subjects, structures and practices of world politics is not "objective,"
since there exists no objective world separate from the collective construction of it by observers
or actors;
• the appropriate methodology for the social sciences is not that of the natural sciences, and
there is no methodological unity of science. Interpretive methods that attempt to uncover actors'
understandings of the organization (and possibilities) of their social world are the central focus
of research;
• the purpose of theory is not prediction (control) or the construction of transhistorical,
generalizable causal claims; contextual understanding and practical knowledge is the
appropriate goal.
Krause/7
14 These can be contrasted with Robert Keohane's or Joseph Grieco's presentation of the central assumptions of realism,
and with Kenneth Waltz's methodological stance. See the two essays by Robert Keohane in Robert Keohane, ed.,
Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of
Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, 42 (1988), 485-
507, and Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). For a profile of the
roots of critical theory see Richard Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory (London: Methuen,
1979); Fred Dallmayr and Thomas McCarthy, eds., Understanding and Social Inquiry ( Indiana: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1977).
15 Roxanne Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy
in the Philippines," International Studies Quarterly, 37:3 (September 1993), 298. Emphasis hers.
These claims have deep philosophic roots, and different scholars would "sign on" to them
claims in different degrees, but they pose a sharp contrast to neorealist or neoliberal scholarship in
International Relations.14 One convenient way to highlight this contrast is Roxanne Doty's distinction
between "how" and "why" questions. The latter are concerned "with explaining why particular
decisions resulting in specific courses of action were made," the former with "how the subjects, objects,
and interpretive dispositions were socially constructed such that certain practices were made
possible."15 Most importantly, "how" questions are logically prior to "why" questions: before particular
courses of action can be selected, the range of possible or plausible options has to be constructed, and
scholars have to understand the way in which certain options (such as "maintaining reputation," or
"gaining prestige") acquire meaning or value. In security studies (as I will discuss below), this involves
constructing the nature (and source) of threats, the "object" being secured, and the possibilities for
reinforcing, ameliorating or even overcoming "security dilemmas." Traditional approaches take all of
these issues as givens.
Behind each of these claims lies a set of arguments too large to explore here. But I can at least
close off some common avenues of objection by demonstrating with a few examples what these claims
do not imply. Unfortunately, the most insidious counter-arguments mounted against critical theories
(which some scholars occasionally play into) usually involve linking some or all of these claims to
other, ancillary, propositions that are not a necessary part of the core of critical theoretical approaches.
It is as if the advocacy of nuclearization for Germany were counted as compelling evidence against
neorealism, or the use of formal modelling techniques taken as a criticism of institutionalist theory.
The first "red herring" is the argument that critical theorists understate, ignore or "wish away"
the importance of the state. In no way does the claim that the principle institutions of world politics are
socially constructed imply this. Many critical scholars recognize that the state (or at least the state
system) has reached a historical high point, and that it presents a powerful object of loyalty and
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aspiration that needs perhaps to be taken more seriously.16 Others are interested in examining the way
in which the substantive and normative content of the concept of "state sovereignty" may have changed
and be changing.17 Still others are interested in the transformation from the medieval to the modern, as
a means of highlighting the ways in which the state was "constructed" out of the political, economic
and ideational matrix of that period.18
A related claim suggests that critical theorists are committed to a belief that identities (whether
state or individual) are infinitely malleable, and can be changed like sets of clothing.19 The most
extreme version of this is the accusation that critical approaches represent pure "idealism" - the belief
that ideas are the driving force of history, and that if our ideas are simply changed, so too will be the
world. This canard is the least fair of all, as even Mearsheimer recognizes in a footnote!20 It
misinterprets the argument that the process of constituting political subjects (such as states) endows
them with identities and interests that are not just "given." The only claim advanced here is that
interests must be "endogenized" in our theories (Wendt's term), or rather, that the "interests" of political
subjects such as states are not given by structures, but are generated by social processes of interaction
between them.21 More importantly for critical International Relations, since the state is an "abstraction"
or construct (states don't choose, people do), the process of endowing states with interests is a social
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one, whereby particular sets of individuals advocate and develop common understandings of interests
in order to motivate collective social action (under the heading of "foreign policy, for example). Thus
integration theory, for example, would focus attention on the interaction between France and Germany,
and the process whereby the relevant elites (perhaps even the entire population) began to
reconceptualize their interests as "Europeans" in ways that excluded the possibility of violent conflict
between their "states."22 No one, however, would claim that this is either a simple or an easy process -
only that a realist acceptance of state interests as given completely excludes (by definition) study of this
issue.
A third "red herring" that attacks critical methodology accuses it of "subjectivism," colloquially
presented as the "anything goes" argument. Mearsheimer latches onto this when he quotes Richard
Ashley to the effect that "there are no constants, no fixed meanings, no secure grounds, no profound
secrets, no final structures or limits to history...there is only interpretation."23 It must be acknowledged
that some variants (most often labelled post-modern) of critical scholarship would adopt an "anything
goes" position (and argue that all interpretations are arbitrary), but most scholars would not. The
acceptance that our knowledge (as scholars) of the subjects, structures and practices of world politics is
not "objective," does not even lead all scholars to a rejection of naturalist models for science. Some,
such as Alex Wendt or Michael Barnett, "fully endorse the scientific project of falsifying theories
against evidence."24 Others accept neither Ashley's nor Wendt's position, and argue that although social
science should not emulate the methodology of the natural sciences, their commitment to an
interpretive method does not imply rejection of the idea that there are better or worse interpretations -
only a rejection of the idea that they are arbitrated against some external "reality" rather than against
social actors' understandings of their world.25
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The fourth point concerns stasis and change, and illustrates the "what you look for is what you
see" nature of realist arguments. A realist casts his or her eye over 700 years of history and sees a
ceaseless repetition of state competition for power, suspicion and insecurity. Some even go further
back, and interpret the medieval world, or the world of Greek city-states, in similar terms. But when
these claims are examined closely, they often turn out to rest upon tendentious or implausible readings
of history that are little better than Whig or Toynbee-esque versions.26 The fallback position - that
neorealists are not trying to make determinate predictions, but are trying to construct transhistorical,
generalizable causal claims in order to explain a small number of big things - does not obviate these
problems. First, it assumes the possibility of transhistorical generalization - of uncovering some sort of
"laws of history" - which historicist accounts deny, and which are in some disrepute in other fields of
social science.27 Second, it opens the door for other (even critical) scholars to offer to account for a
large number of perhaps equally important but "smaller" things. A critical or constructivist scholar sees
over the 700 years of European history variation, change, evolution and decline. The rise and decline of
absolutism, the rise of modern nationalism, imperialism, the advent of self-determination and
decolonization, and recent claims for democracy and human rights have all embedded inter-state
interactions in a complex web of ideas that gives practical (and shifting) content to understandings of
interests.28
This sort of contextual understanding and practical knowledge is what scholarship should
aspire to, and since human agents are engaged in constructing their world (and their future), scientific
models of explain-predict-control (the old Comte-ian formula) are at best misguided, and at worst
pernicious.29 Hence it is no accident that Robert Cox, for example, eschews prediction, since he
believes it neither possible nor desirable, except within a framework of "problem-solving theory" that
takes the social and political order as fixed and works within this assumption via a determinist "if-then"
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logic that denies human agency.30 To claim then that a failure to make predictions is a weakness of
critical theory is to miss the point entirely, and to evaluate it against other's goals.
Finally, and most importantly, the core assumptions of a critical approach do not commit one to
a particular political position, except insofar as the acceptance that world politics is not static, and that
its structures and identities are constructed, implies the possibility of change. One can easily conclude
that socially constructed structures are deeply entrenched and unlikely to change rapidly, which is the
position of a "critical realist" such as Robert Cox. Or it is possible to disagree radically on the forces
that construct the social world - neo-Marxists such as Stephen Gill often fall back to material forces,
while feminist scholars such as Carol Cohn or Sandra Whitworth would stress the gendered nature of
social (including international) relations.31 This is not much different from the claim that neorealists and
neoliberals differ on the importance of relative versus absolute gains, while remaining committed to a
rationalist approach!
Critical Security Studies
What does all of this mean for security studies? The challenge faced by proponents of critical security
studies is to present a coherent and intellectually robust research agenda that generates interesting
debates and insights into the complexities and potentials of contemporary (and past) security issues.
Space prevents me from a comprehensive review of all the literature that could be included under this
umbrella; instead, I will highlight a variety of bodies of critical scholarship to demonstrate that there is
an active and vibrant research community in critical security studies (although none of the authors I cite
has been asked to wear this label!). I have organized this work under three headings: studies of the
construction of "objects" of security; examinations of the construction of threats and appropriate
responses; and evaluations of the possibilities for amelioration or transformation of security dilemmas.
What I have not done is engage in a discussion of the appropriate methodology for critical security
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studies, and the way in which this may contrast with a rationalist approach; that task awaits another
paper.32
The Obscure Object of Security
The first body of literature inquires into how the object of security is constructed. A neorealist would
find this question odd, for the object of security is the state, and national security (understood as the
safeguarding of core values from forceful threats) the core concept. This is not a definitional move;
casting the state as the guardian or custodian of values is a powerful resolution to central problems of
political life. It begins with a "state of nature" account in which the individual subject is presented as an
autonomous instrumentally-rational actor confronted by an environment filled with other like actors
who represent a source of insecurity: hence the classic security dilemma. From this starting point, there
can be no security in the absence of authority, the state becomes the primary locus of security, authority
and obligation, and the security of "citizens" is identified with (and guaranteed by) that of the state.
Those who stand outside the state represent potential or actual threats, and relations between states are
thereby rendered purely "strategic" (or contractual), which provides the basis for claims about
international "anarchy."33 This account has its philosophical roots in "state of nature" analogies
supposedly drawn from Hobbes or Rousseau, and in a contractarian vision of social life drawn from
thinkers such as Locke.34
Perhaps the most straightforward challenge to this vision of the referent object of traditional
security studies has been the effort to broaden its agenda to bring "new issues" such as environmental
degradation, economic well-being, or migration and population into the discipline.35 This effort is not
"critical" in any self-conscious sense, and does not challenge the philosophical underpinnings of the
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traditional vision; it simply asserts that (for example), environmental challenges "demand a redefinition
of what constitutes national security [because]...the assumptions and institutions that have governed
international relations in the postwar era are a poor fit with these new realities."36 The object of security
should not, however, remain the state, since what is "really" threatened is not an abstraction like the
state, but the material well-being of individuals, or the "ecosystem" itself.37 Only the constraints
imposed by traditional categories of thought have limited our grasp of this reality, and hence our
conceptions of security must change to meet new challenges. This argument also assumes (usually
implicitly, sometimes explicitly) that the choice of which issues fall under the sign of security is in part
a political one, and that one of the goals is to contest the definition of what counts as a security threat to
the nation-state.38
Most of the research conducted into issues of environmental security, however, has been
concerned with the potential for rapid environmental change or degradation to catalyze violent conflicts
between states (or communal groups), and hence has not challenged directly the construction of the
referent object of security. For example, researchers involved in projects on "Environmental Change
and Acute Conflict" and "Environment, Population and Security" have attempted to assess the role of
environmental scarcities in the outbreak of violent conflict.39 Peter Gleick and Miriam Lowi, for
example, have placed access to and control of water as an aspect of "strategic rivalry" within an
expanded conception of "geopolitical" conflict (in particular in the Middle East), while studies of the
civil conflict in Rwanda and of the relationship between urban growth and violence have sought to
determine the extent of links between scarcity and varying forms of violent conflict.40 Even so, by
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reorienting analysis away from relations between the military forces of states (and classical security
dilemmas) to the underlying dynamics that can serve as the sources of interstate conflict, this research
responds to David Baldwin's observation that during the Cold War "the study of national security grew
more narrow and rigid during the Cold War than it had been before," and that it "militarized the study
of security" in ways that occluded a rich tradition of thought on "the nature, causes, effects and
prevention of war.41
A more complex (and self-consciously critical) challenge that takes (implicitly or explicitly)
women as the "object" of study (if not of security) has been posed by scholars such as Cynthia Enloe,
writing on gender and security issues. Without resorting to essentialist arguments about differences
between men and women, Enloe draws attention to the ways in which policies and practices under the
rubric of "security" have a specific impact on women, enmeshing them in a web of violence,
subordination and insecurity; and the way in which women's definitions of security may be more
multidimensional or may challenge the notions of identity at the core of the state-centric vision.42 One
response from orthodox scholarship is that this work does not challenge the central problematic of
security studies - the causes of war and conditions of peace - but focuses on its consequences, which is
a different issue. But in a constructivist logic, causes, conditions and consequences are not so easily
separable. Enloe, for example, does not simply discuss the impact of American military bases on
Philippine women, but is making a stronger claim about how such an organization of social relations is
a crucial part of what makes the projection of American military might possible. Second, a gendered
analysis is intended, at its most profound levels, to challenge the orthodox construction of the "object"
of security (the state) by examining the ontological underpinnings of neorealist International
Relations.43 Attempts to redefine the object of security from a gendered perspective do, however, have
to confront the ways in which women (and men) have historically identified themselves also (perhaps
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even primarily) as "citizens" and have participated in the state-centric discourses of security, sacrifice
and war to which a gendered analysis draws attention.44
Other attempts to address this last issue have focused on how national security, identity, and
interests have been constructed and defined, and on the "discourses of danger" that have been used to
secure a society's collective identity in the modern world. David Campbell's monograph on American
security, for example, explores the way in which the "self-other" dichotomy (which has been
challenged from many quarters as overly-simplistic), meets the need of the state for "discourses of
`danger' to provide a new theology of truth about who and what `we' are by highlighting who or what
`we' are not, and what `we' have to fear."45 Similarly, Jutta Weldes takes seriously the concept of
"national interest," but challenges the neorealist idea that threats to it are self-evident, and given from
the capabilities of states. Her detailed research on the documentary record of the Cuban missile crisis
demonstrates clearly that the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba was not unproblematically
understood as a threat to the United States; that this threat had to be constructed through a process of
discussion and debate that contained many significant points of choice for the relevant decision
makers.46
A fourth assault on the state-centrism of traditional scholarship has been mounted by the so-
called "Copenhagen school," which takes as its starting point the distinction between state and society.
They argue that security studies needs to adopt an understanding of the "duality" of security: a
combination of state security concerned with sovereignty and societal security concerned with identity.47
This idea of societal security places the origins, structures and dynamics of collective identity
formation and the connection between identities and interests (and threats to them) at the heart of its
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problematic. "At its most basic social identity is what enables the word `we' to be used" as a means by
which to identify collectively the object to be secured.48 Research under this rubric has concentrated on
the dynamic of European integration, the creation of a European "identity" by exclusion of the Russian
or Turkish other, and the European response to "threats" posed to identities by migration (of guest
workers, refugees, or illegal immigrants).49 It effectively "endogenizes" the questions of identities and
interests, and challenges the rationalist idea that although identities may change, they do so over such a
long time scale as to be irrelevant for most questions. By contrast, European identity can be shown to
draw upon deeply held historical narratives, but to be adaptable and shifting in response to the concrete
circumstances of the post-1945 (or even post-Cold War) period.
Constructing Threats, Constructing Responses
The second body of closely related literature inquires into how threats are defined and constructed.
Again, a pure structural realist would find this question odd, for threats in a self-help system arise from
the material capabilities of possible opponents. An amended version of this, as presented by Stephen
Walt's "balance of threat theory," does appear to concede ground that is occupied by critical analyses.
Walt argues that states balance not just against capabilities, but "against the states that pose the greatest
threat," and threats are not objectively specifiable in the same sense that capabilities are, since they
include offensive intentions.50 The world of threats and intentions, however, is supremely a constructed
one, involving history, culture, communication, ideologies and related factors, and Walt's analysis does
not tell us how or where threats (or their absence) arise, but takes for granted that they can (or should)
be unproblematically perceived by decision-makers or scholars.51 By contrast, a critical approach would
again ask: how, from the welter of information and interaction among states and their representatives,
are threats constructed, and mobilized against?
Not surprisingly, most work here has focused on the American construction of the "Soviet
threat." Bradley Klein's argument, based on an analysis of major documents of the early Cold War and
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creation of NATO, is that capabilities played hardly any role in the assessment of the Soviet threat:
"what carried the day, in the absence of reliable intelligence estimates, was a series of discursively
constructed claims about the nature of the Soviet totalitarian state and about its implacable global
purposes."52 Jennifer Milliken's work on the Korean War highlights the effort that was involved, both
within American policy circles and in the multilateral arena, to construct the North Korean invasion of
the South as part of a Moscow-led aggressive expansionism, and not as an internecine struggle among
Koreans.53 Both these works parallel some of the post-revisionist scholarship on the origins of the Cold
War, that emphasize the effort that was involved in creating an American consensus over its
international role.54 Simon Dalby's book challenges the inevitability of the "end of detente" and focuses
on the construction of the Second Cold War. It analyzes the uses made by the American Committee on
the Present Danger (and associated advocates) of geopolitical logic, historical determinism, and nuclear
war-fighting logic to construct a series of interlocked arguments for the military build-up and European
nuclear deployments that characterized the Reagan presidency.55
The post-Cold War threat environment has also provided extremely fertile ground for critical
analysis, since the rhetorical nature of many threat discourses is evident. David Mutimer, for example,
has examined in detail the metaphorical and linguistic construction of a "proliferation threat" for the
United States (and its alliance partners).56 The elements of this have ranged from the efforts to
dismantle the Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes, to the conflict with North
Korea over its possible nuclearization, to the creation of a "counter-proliferation" policy within the
Clinton administration, and the resources devoted to such things as ballistic missile defence programs.
One strand of feminist scholarship also falls under this umbrella. Cynthia Weber, for example, uses
psychoanalytic theory to uncover the masculinized categories within which American intervention
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practices in Panama (and elsewhere) were organized and justified.57 Nancy Hartsock and Carol Cohn
have examined the way in which the "making" of soldiers invokes a range of gendered and
masculinized concepts to permit the creation and control of social institutions of organized violence, or
the way in which nuclear policies familiarize and "tame" the horror of nuclear weapons.58
Another line of research that is within the core subject matter of traditional security studies
examines the way in which security policies constructed appropriate responses to the threats. Of course,
often the construction of the threat and the response to it go together, but in principle research can be
conducted on the latter without the former. Most attention here has focused on deterrence and arms
control policies. For example, Emanuel Adler has charted the way in which the arms control "epistemic
community" that emerged in the United States after the Cuban Missile Crisis charted a path out of the
sterile debates over "disarmament" that had characterized previous thinking, and which generated
cooperative security policies between the superpowers.59 Perhaps the most attention, however, has been
devoted to the elaboration and implementation of nuclear deterrence policies, a frequent target for
critical analysis. At the most straightforward level, this literature has drawn attention to "nukespeak" -
to the linguistic construction of the nuclear debate, and the ways in which weapons were "normalized"
or opponents trivialized in order to promote particular nuclear deterrence policies.60 At a more
conceptual level, scholars such as Michael Williams have attempted to uncover the paradoxical
operation of the "logic of deterrence," locked into an oscillation between the twin poles of counter-
force and counter-value strategies, the contradictions and tensions of each which generate the
movement between the two.61 This analysis in fact situates deterrence theory (and policy) precisely as
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an attempted rationalist response to what even Hans Morgenthau recognized as a "qualitative
transformation of the meaning of our existence."62
All of these authors are concerned with how questions: how was an American or Western
interest in opposing what was characterized as "Soviet expansionism" created and what forces did it
mobilize, how did the language of nuclear deterrence operate as a powerful form to tame these
weapons, and exclude particular options for dealing with them, or how do gendered (or more generally
metaphoric) formulations construct "others" or sources of threats? The most common objection raised
to all of this work is that these constructions operate as simple glosses on the interaction of the "real
interests" that lie behind "the veil of facts." The response to this is a complex one, but all of these
authors recognize that they need to challenge the orthodox neorealist argument that a confrontation
between East and West was inevitable (which implicitly claims that the "why" question precedes the
"how" question), that the construction of the Soviet threat was merely the public gloss on the operation
of real interests in great power clashes, or that the particular form that this confrontation took was
unimportant to an understanding of its causes and consequences. Hence, most of them pay particular
attention to going beyond a demonstration of the constructed nature of threat discourses to show how
these constructions could have been different, given the concrete historical circumstances in which
choices were made. These are not "pure idealist" "if only" arguments.
Society and Community under "Anarchy"
A third axis of analysis for work in critical security studies has focused on the potential for "escaping"
or overcoming the security dilemma. Needless to say, this approach is equally incomprehensible to
neorealist scholarship, which posits the security dilemma as an axiomatic "given" of world politics; a
logical consequence of the premises of autonomous actors seeking to survive in anarchy. The precise
scope and acuteness of the security dilemma is subject to such factors as the nature of the offense-
defence balance, but the underlying condition itself cannot be transcended.63 Not surprisingly,
scholarship that has challenged the unchanging nature of the security dilemma has not been met with
open arms by the traditional literature.
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Several lines of argument can be discerned here, however. The first, which is not "critical" in
the sense outlined above, has made various adjectival modifications to "security," under the heading of
"collective," "common," "comprehensive," or "cooperative" security.64 With the possible exception of
collective security, these arguments argue for an amelioration, not a "transcending," of the security
dilemma. As David Dewitt has noted, "the intent has been to replace the cold war security
structure...with a multilateral process and framework with the following attributes: it must be geared
toward reassurance, rather than deterrence; it must at best replace or at least co-exist with bilateral
alliances; and it must promote both military and non-military security.65 Hence the most prominent
advocates of "cooperative security" have argued that it requires "a commitment to regulate the size,
technical composition, investment patterns, and operational practices of all military forces by mutual
consent for mutual benefit" which "involv[es] extensive agreed-on constraints on military preparations
[that] would have to require all parties to accept a level of intrusive monitoring of their defense
programs."66 But in more "theoretical" terms, these arguments operate under the general umbrella of the
neorealist-neoliberal debate, and do not present a critical analytic challenge to it.
A more interesting line of research, convincingly presented by scholars such as Daniel
Deudney or Emanuel Adler, examines the potential for overcoming anarchy through the creation of
"security communities." Deudney, for example, argues that the "Philadelphian system" of the American
union between 1787 and 1861 was neither a "real-state" (enjoying a monopoly of violence, for
example), nor a competitive system of states. Instead, it was a conscious alternative: "the designers of
the Philadelphian system understood the dynamics of anarchy, but the interstate anarchy of Europe was
a model of what they sought to avoid, not an inevitability to which they sought to adjust...[hence]
anarchy can be overcome under certain conditions."67 Deudney recognizes that this implies a rethinking
of security, especially in contemporary contexts such as the European Union. This theme is taken up by
Adler, who draws attention to the way in which regionalization processes in the European Union, North
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America, the Southern Cone, the OSCE, and perhaps Southern Africa "point in the direction of a
change in the ways in which political, economic, and cultural elites conceptualize international
relations."68 His work explicitly revives Karl Deutsch's concept of "pluralistic security communities,"
but moves beyond its somewhat functionalist focus on such things as transaction flows, towards more
cognitive (and evolutionary) elements such as learning, stable expectations, shared practices, or
identification of common self-images.69
Parallel to this would be Bradley Klein's work on the creation of the Western Alliance, which
emphasizes the way in which "the West has constituted itself as a political and cultural identity" to be
secured.70 His work can be usefully contrasted to both neo-realist and neoliberal accounts: a neorealist
prediction (insofar as it is capable of offering one) for post-Cold War NATO would be of weakening
and perhaps dissolution or disintegration; a neoliberal account would emphasize the possibility of
institutional inertia and the continued utility of NATO for lowering transaction costs and easing
collaboration problems between Western states.71 By contrast, his critical analysis focuses on the
possibilities for perpetuating a discursive "community of interests" as the sine qua non for avoiding
conflicts and maintaining a zone of peace. From an explicitly feminist perspective, Simona Sharoni
examines the role of Palestinian and Israeli women in that conflict, and draws attention both to the
ways in which discourses (and practices) of "citizenship" and "nationalism" are constructed to become
a primary identity that "drowns out" (perhaps in the name of mobilizing the state for war" other identity
relationships, and the practical implications of various attempts to overcome this.72
A third, more methodologically-oriented, analysis is presented by scholars such as Karen
Fierke or Ole Waever. Waever situates security studies within the context of "speech acts": his research
goal is to study the process by which threats are represented politically, to examine "who can `do' or
`speak' security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects...what is
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essential is the designation of an existential threat...and the acceptance of that designation by a
significant audience."73 This audience need not be "national," and in fact some of the most interesting
acts of "speaking security" are those used to define the broader communities of identity. Fierke takes up
this theme in her detailed case study of the "grammar" of representation of the Western community
(within Western Europe and NATO) and its relationship with the East (especially with Eastern
European dissident movements) during the waning stages of the Cold War. Her goal is to examine the
"demise of a particular constellation of relationships and practices," as a means to uncover the
reconstructive potential that will shape the future of the European security order.74
Disciplining Practices
Traditional scholarship in security studies has responded to the challenges posed by the different
threads of critical scholarship outlined above through a series of what could be called "disciplining
practices," which I have labelled "cooptation," "exclusion," "character assassination," and "definitional
fiat." I am not claiming that these practices are part of a malicious or conspiratorial program to keep the
"critical" from contaminating security studies. I am, however, arguing that the consequence of these
practices is a severe constriction of what we can study and how we can study it that serves neither
scholarship nor practical politics.
The first disciplining move, cooptation, has been manifest most clearly within security studies
in the rapid slide from "strategic studies" to "security studies" as the label or umbrella for the field. One
position in this debate argues that strategic and security studies are distinct, and that the latter ought to
expand the categories and areas of analysis considerably beyond the traditional purview of the former.
Strategic studies should, on this account, retain its more narrow purpose and scope - a body of expertise
on the military aspects of international relations - while being embedded within the broader ambit of
security studies. As Barry Buzan, the most prominent exponent of this view, admits, however, this
position is in the minority.75 Rather, the majority position has argued that the proper umbrella or title
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should be "security studies," but that it should retain a relatively narrow (or only slightly enlarged)
understanding of its scope and purpose. This position is staked out by scholars such as Stephen Walt,
Joseph Nye, or Sean Lynn-Jones.76 Nye and Lynn-Jones draw the line clearly: "a subject that is only
remotely related to central political problems of threat perception and management among sovereign
states would be regarded as peripheral."77 The implication, however, is that the methods, focus and
orientation of "strategic studies" should be carried over into this new realm, effectively defining away
broader conceptions of "security studies." As Buzan puts it, this "would be like giving responsibility
for designing a national transportation system to the makers of automobiles."78
The practical exclusionary consequences of this are easy to find. Mark Levy, for example, in
his review of the environment and security literature, characterizes these views as "existential" visions
of the link between environment and security. He concedes the importance of ecological hazards to
human well-being, but argues that the work is marked more by a desire to heighten the political profile
of environmental issues by placing them within the rhetoric of security than by any sustainable status as
"security issues."79 Likewise, Robert Dorff argues that although a broader definition of security
highlights significant contemporary "problems," these do not constitute "security" issues because
"`problems' is not a concept...[it] provides us with no ordering of reality that we can use to create a
common understanding of what it is that we are talking about and the range of possible policy
approaches to addressing those problems."80 But by treating the broadening of the concept of security
as a "political" rather than analytical move, the traditional view is positioned as an apolitical analytic
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The Mcarthyist tone is inescapable, and unforgivable.
stance that is not equally driven by (or established upon) a set of value commitments. As a result,
alternative conceptions of security are judged by how well they fit within and contribute to the
(purportedly objective) prevailing categories of the field - a concern with inter-state violent conflict.
Not surprisingly, the answer turns out to be that they are not really security issues at all. Although Levy
admits it is possible to conceive of "global security," he defines security as "national security" - as a
situation where threats to a "nation's most important values" come from the actions of "foreigners."81
But adopting the taken-for-granted political resolutions of orthodox security studies is not a neutral
point against which alternative conceptions can be judged.
The third disciplining move, character assassination, is by far the most difficult to pin down
(and avoid polemics). I think, however, that it is not difficult to agree with Wendt that Mearsheimer's
"discussion of [critical theorists'] research program [is] full of conflations, half-truths, and
misunderstandings."82 The goal of critical security studies is not to make "states, or more precisely,
their inhabitants and leaders...care about concepts like `rectitude,' `rights,' and `obligations'"; its
scholars are not naively committed to "replac[ing] realism with a discourse that emphasizes harmony
and peace"; they are not "intolerant of other discourses about international politics" (except perhaps
when they themselves are not taken seriously as scholars); and the phrase "intersubjective
understandings and expectations" is not "jargon" (any more than any conceptual language).83 Of course,
individual scholars may be guilty of turgid prose, or can be committed to one or another vision of a
desirable future world - just as Mearsheimer doubtless is - but this is not (as noted above) the core of
the project. Finally, as I hope this paper amply demonstrates, the distinguishing feature of critical
security studies literature is not its lack of empirical content.
A more interesting version of this argument is presented by Stephen Walt, when he argues that
while it is important to permit additions or amendments to the orthodox core of security studies, to
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challenge fundamentally its foundations is intellectually self-indulgent and even perhaps politically
irresponsible. As he says, "issues of war and peace are too important for the field to be diverted into a
prolix and self-indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world."84 One response from the
critical camp is that the charge of political irresponsibility rests more strongly on those who place
scholarship at the service of the state, or who attempt to uncover transhistorical generalizations at such
a high level of abstraction that they eschew engagements with practical political problems (or which, if
true, deny any scope for human agency).85
The final disciplining practice, argument by definitional fiat, is most evident in the nearly-
tautological assertions of the nature of world politics over the past several hundred years of human
history. Several examples have been noted above, ranging from the blanket assertion that inter-state
relations over the past several centuries can be captured by simple models of self-interested balancing
or bandwagoning behaviour, or that deductive logic can be used to "prove" that states pursue relative
over absolute gains.86 A contemporary manifestation of this appears in attempts to incorporate
nationalism into security studies, either by treating identity groups as "given" unitary rational actors, or
by explaining the rise of nationalism as a tactical choice for political entrepreneurs.87 Neither approach
actually "theorizes" nationalism. The first leaves aside all the interesting questions about how (under
what circumstances, with what consequences) such groups emerge and differentiate themselves, and
treats "nationalism" as mere rhetoric; the second ignores the consequences of this rhetorical choice for
the construction of threats (who or what is threatened, by whom, and in what manner), and projects
nationalism solely through the prism of interstate relations. Neither provides an adequate understanding
of the complex forces at work in contemporary communal conflicts, or for potential points of resolution
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and exit from them. One has to step outside of the neorealist paradigm in order to pose the sorts of
questions whose answers have, in today's world, inescapably concrete consequences.88
Conclusion: Powerful Problematics
My goal in this paper has been to deflect the criticism that little empirical research has been done by
critical security studies scholars, and to demonstrate the diverse and rich threads of the critical research
agenda. This is not, however, meant as an unabashed defence or apologia of all of the scholarship in
this area, much of which does not live up to the terms of its epistemological and ontological
foundations. In fact, as Charles Taylor has pointed out, if scholars took seriously the requirements of
interpretivism, there would probably be a considerable thinning of its ranks! But critical security
studies scholarship is surely no worse in this respect than the corpus of security studies as a whole.
A final task of any critical approach to security studies would be to give an interpretive account
of the resilience and attraction of rationalist or neorealist conceptions of security. This will have to be
deferred for another paper, but I can at least point out that such an account would follow in the tracks
of scholars such as Azar Gat and John Shy, who have argued that the search for the "laws of war" goes
back at least to the Enlightenment, and that this vision of truth and method "has become, during almost
two centuries, so deeply embedded in Western consciousness that many adherents refuse to accept it as
a `mode' of thinking at all."89 The issue is not one of bad faith, false consciousness or power plays in
the scholarly community (although all can and do exist), but rather of how rationalist accounts resonate
within broader conceptions of theory and purpose for social sciences. Likewise, the metaphorical force
of the Hobbesian "state of nature" and its contractarian account of world politics must be
acknowledged, especially since it presents a powerful resolution to old and thorny questions of political
life. The challenge is to ensure that our theoretical conceptions of what is possible and desirable are not
bound within rigid intellectual straightjackets that place us far behind policy-makers' (and other
political actors) appreciation of the complexities and potential of the contemporary world, or that
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prevent us from thinking creatively and seriously about resolutions to complex contemporary problems
of war and peace.
